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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
J. R. STONE COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
Supreme Court No. 14834 
RAYMOND S . KEA TE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
---0000000---
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
---0000000---
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action wherein the plaintiff-appellant seeks 
remedies and adjudications with respect to an option to purchase 
real property which was given by plaintiff-appellant to 
defendant-respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court entered a declaratory judgment construing 
certain provisions of the Option but the lower court declined 
to grant a judgment declaring the Option void and further 
declined to enter a decree of specific performance. 
THE NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks an ajudication by this Court 
that under the facts and circumstances of the case the option 
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to purchase real property granted by plaintiff-appellant to 
defendant-respondent is of no further force and effect. In 
the alternative, if the Option is still capable of exercise, 
plaintiff-appellant seeks a reversal of certain aspects of the 
declaratory judgment which purport to construe the Option. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In January, 1971, defendant-respondent, Raymond s. 
Keate, (hereinafter referred to as "Keate") contacted Gerald R. 
Turner, a Salt Lake attorney, for the purposes of assisting 
Keate in obtaining financing for his air filter manufacturing 
business, Fiber Glass Products, Inc. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 44,40). 
Fiber Glass Products was in need of funds in excess of $400, 000 .. 
for working capital, equipment and construction of a new plant 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 40). Attorney Turner experienced difficulty 
in obtaining this financing because the amounts were large 
and the available collateral was insufficient (Tr. Vol. II, PP· 
44, 49). 
After several contacts with various lenders (Tr. Vol. IV 
pp. 14-15), Attorney Turner focused on the lease guarantee 
provisions of the Small Business Administration regulations 
15 16) Under t hese regulations, a landlo~ (Tr. Vol. IV, pp. - . 
could purchase the building, lease it to Fiber Glass Products 
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and the SBA would guarantee the landlord the lease payments. 
Turner informed Keate that this arrangement maximized the value 
of available collateral by using both the building and the 
lease as collateral and obtaining the funds through two different 
borrowers (Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 15-16). 
Inasmuch as the SBA lease guarantee provisions appeared 
to be the only arrangement with any probability of success 
(Tr. Vol. IV, p. 16), Keate requested Turner to proceed with 
that application (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 16). However, one aspect 
of the transaction was unsatisfactory to Keate inasmuch as he 
felt the business could be sold in a year at a handsome profit. 
In order to meet this problem, Keate was given the option to 
purchase the building. The reasons for giving the option to 
Keate rather than to Fiber Glass were that it would help Keate 
in attempting to sell the business (Tr. Vol. II, p. 64)1 and 
would permit Keate to make a profit if the business went 
broke (Tr. Vol. II, p. 641 Vol. IV, p. 941 Vol. III, PP· 12-13) • 
One vital prerequisite to obtaining the lease guarantee 
financing was locating a person willing to purchase the building 
and lease it to Fiber Glass Products under this arrangement. 
Attorney Turner was aware that his brother-in-law, 
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may be willing to participate in the transaction as the 
owner and lessor (Tr. Vol. II, p. 49; Vol IV, p. 18). Mr. 
Stone consented to this participation so long as it was through 
a corporation. Thus, the plaintiff-appellant, J. R. Stone 
Company (hereinafter referred to as "Stone Company") was 
organized. 
Although problems were encountered including a change 
of the construction site, the arrangement was finally carried 
out. On October 4, 1971, Stone Company borrowed the money 
for the purchase of the real property and the construction of 
the building (Ex. 7). The loan was secured by a trust deed 
describing the building (Ex. 8). By a lease dated September 30, 
1972, Stone leased the building to Fiber Glass Products 
Company. However, Fiber Glass Products did not occupy the 
building until February, 1972, (Tr. Vol. I, p. 27). A copy 
of the lease is before the court as Exhibit 4. On September 30, 
1971, Fiber Glass Company got the working capital loan from 
valley Bank & Trust Company (Ex. 39). This note was also 
secured by another trust deed on the building (Ex. 3 9) . Neither 
John R. Stone nor Stone Company received the benefit of the 
proceeds of this loan. It was used exclusively in the Fiber 
Glass company business. On September 30, 1971, the Option 
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to Purchase, the document in dispute in this case, was prepared 
by Gerald Turner, and executed by Stone Company. A copy of 
the Option is before the Court as Exhibit 3. It is important 
to note that although all of the transactions involved Fiber 
Glass Products, the Option ran in favor of Raymond Keate 
personally. There was never any written authorization from 
Fiber Glass Products authorizing Keate to personally receive 
this benefit (Tr. Vol. III, pp. 12-13). 
Fiber Glass moved into the building in February, 1972, 
and began its operation (Tr. Vol. I, p. 27). On July 10, 
1974, Fiber Glass discontinued business and vacated the building. 
At the time the building was vacated, neither Raymond Keate 
nor any employee or representative of Fiber Glass Company made 
any attempt to notify John R. Stone or Stone Company that the 
building was being vacated (Tr. Vol. I, P · 4 6) • 
Fiber Glass Products, under the complete supervision 
of Keate (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 41-42), occupied the building in 
total disregard of its obligations under the Lease. Despite 
the obligations of paragraph 10 of the Lease (ex. 4), Fiber 
Glass company left the property in totally untenantable condition 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 28; Vol. II, p. 7). There was a large 
accumulation of debris and garbage strewn about the building 
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(Tr. Vol. II, p. 73; Exs. 42 (a), (b), (c), (e), (g), {i), 
(1), {m), (n), (q), (s), {u), (v), (w), (y), (cc) and (dd)). 
There was large accumulations of garbage and debris shown 
over the grounds (Exs. 42 (x), 44 (2), (3), (4), (5), (9), (14), 
(15), and (16)). Employees had used the insulation on the 
walls as dart boards, the glass rods being substituted for 
darts (Tr. Vol. I, p. 51; Vol. I, pp. 44-45; Exs. 42 (h), (v)). 
The metal skin of the building was damaged in many places by 
heavy objects being thrust against it (Exs. 42(f), (k), (o), 
(w) , (aa) , and 4 8 ( 8) ) . Insulation had been torn from the walls 
over most of the building (Exs. 42 (e), (g), (h), (p), (r), 
(t)). The asphalt pavement surrounding the building was 
covered with chemicals and was broken up and separated (Exs. 
42 (o), (x), 44 (10), (11), (12)). Many of the plumbing fixtures 
had been clogged and broken (Exs. 42(y), (z), (d)). Keate's 
office was piled high with debris (Exs. 42(m), 42(ee)). The 
company had permitted large accumulations of fiber glass resin 
on the floor of the building (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 3-4; Exs. 42(1), 
(n), (p), (bb)). A piece of this resin which was pulled from 
the floor is before the court as Exhibit 45. Keate admitted 
that accumulations of the type demonstrated by Exhibit 45 were 
1 tion' 
over 30% of the floor area (Tr. Vol. I, p. 60) and accumu a · 
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of a lesser depth covered another 20% of the building (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 61) · This fiber glass resin grows harder with the passage 
of time and becomes more difficult to remove (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 101). Inasmuch as the Stone Company was not notified that 
Fiber Glass Products had vacated the building (Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 46, 85), the resin sat for three months. When notice was 
finally received that the building was vacant, it required 
jackhammers (Tr, Vol. II, p. 3), and bulldozers (Tr. Vol. IV, 
p. 29), to remove the material from the floors. 
The accumulation of debris, resin and damage to the 
building made the premises untenantable (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 6-7), 
28). Since tenantability was a condition of the lease guarantee 
insurance (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 12-13, Ex. 14), Stone Company 
was unable to receive any benefits under the lease guarantee 
insurance until the building was cleaned and repaired (Ex. 14). 
By reason of the extensive damage and accumulations 
of debris and resin, the cost of repair and clean-up was more 
than John R. Stone or Stone Company could expend. Accordingly, 
John R. Stone and Stone Company applied for a loan with the 
Lockhart company secured by the building (Ex. 1). All proceeds 
of the loan including some of Stone's personal funds were 
used for the clean-up and repair of the building (Exs. 49, 50; 
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Tr. Vol. III, pp. 16-38). The funds were insufficient to pay 
for the entire operation, and so a portion was financed by 
promissory notes from John R. Stone and Stone Company to Mr. 
Stone's father (Tr. Vol. I, p. 8). John R. Stone personally 
spent a lot of time in assisting in the repair and clean-up 
of the premises. The value of his services were $5,156.20 
(Ex. 50, 69; Tr. Vol. III, p. 30). The clean-up oeprations 
were completed in May, 1975 (Tr. Vol. III, p. 49). The total 
cost, of the repair and clean-up was $19,606.50 (Ex. 50). Loan 
proceeds of $15, 000. 00 from Lockhart Company were used to pay 
these expenses. The garbage and debris was so extensive that 
it required forty loads in dump trucks with 15 yard beds to hau. 
it away (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 30). 
Keate waited until after the clean-up and repair was 
completed and then served a notice (Ex. 5) upon John R. Stone 
that Keate intended to exercise the Option. Notice was 
received by the Stone Company on September 8, 1975 (Ex. 5). 
The Notice sent by Keate stated terms which were different from 
the terms set forth in the Option. Keate admitted during the 
course of the trial that he knew that the terms stated in his 
Notice of Exercise were not in accordance with what he knew to 
. . · sly draft& be the actual terms of the Option his attorney previou 
(Tr. Vol. IV, p. 102). The Option agreement had originally 
been prepared by Gerald Turner who acted as Keate's 
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attorney (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 98). When the Option was drafted, 
Turner explained to Keate that the purchase price under the 
Option included 10% of $125,000.00 (Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 33, 77). 
Yet in his Notice of Exercise Keate claimed the figure was 
10% of $117,000.00 (Ex. 5). 
Upon receipt of the Notice of Exercise, Stone responded 
through counsel that the Notice proposed terms different than 
those stated in the Option (Ex. 6). However, since the original 
Option Agreement was attached to the Notice and the Notice 
stated that the attached Option was exercised, Stone was llnsure 
as to whether it constituted an exercise on the basis of the 
original terms or a counter-offer. Thus, with the hope of 
clarifying the matter, Stone noted in his response that he would 
regard it as a valid exercise of the Option according to its 
original terms and confirmed the closing date for September 18, 
1975 (Ex. 6; Tr. Vol. I, p. 30). 
Stone appeared at the closing with a warranty deed 
ready for delivery to Keate describing the real property 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 80-81; Vol. IV, p. 54; Ex. 15). Keate failed 
to appear at the closing and refused to perform any of the 
obligations of the Option contract (Tr. Vol. I, PP· 30-31). 
Keate has never tendered any type of performance either on the 
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closing date or at any date thereafter up to and including the 
date of the corrunencement of this action (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 30-3l) 
Since Keate insisted that the varied terms were the 
only acceptable terms, Stone Company corrunenced this action to 
clear up the problem since it left the title to the land in an 
uncertain position. Stone Company's Amended Complaint sought 
two alternative remedies: (a) a declaration that the Option be 
declared null and void and of no further force and effect; (bl 
a decree of specific performance be entered on the basis of the 
actual terms of the Option. 
The lower court entered a declaratory judgment construir. 
various terms and provisions of the Option Agreement, but did 
not decree specific performance and did not declare the Option 
as null and void. 
Plaintiff-appellant asserts that under the facts and 
circumstances of the case the lower court should have declared 
the Option null and void. In the event the Option is not 
declared null and void, plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal 
of some of the constructions of the lower court with respect to 
the Option. Neither party has appealed the Court's failure to 
grant specific performance. 
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THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE OPTION VOID. 
Stone Company has no dispute with the factual determina-
tions made by the trial court. The issue presented on this appeal 
is that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by not 
granting appropriate relief. Under the facts and circumstances of 
the case, the Option should have been declared void. There are 
only three views of the transaction and each view, under the 
established law, compels the conclusion that the Option is void or 
no longer capable of exercise. The three alternatives are as 
follows: (a) the Option was duly exercised by Keate, and the 
resulting contract was breached by Keate; (b) the Option was 
rejected by Keate by reason of his counter-offer incorporating 
different terms and conditions; (c) the Option was never exercised 
by Keate and was revoked by Stone inasmuch as it was not supported 
by any consideration. Each of these alternatives will be 
separately discussed. 
ALTERNATIVE (a): Option exercised, resulting contract breached. 
Paragraph 3 of the Option to Purchase (Ex. 3) states 
that the Option may be exercised by written notice, signed by 
the Optionee, and sent registered mail to the Optionor. 
on September 8, 1975, a Notice of Exercise of Option 
(Ex. 5) was served on John R. Stone, President of J. R. Stone 
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Company. Attached to the Notice was a xeroxed copy of the 
original Option to Purchase. The first paragraph of the Notic, 
clearly and unequivocally stated that Keate intended to 
exercise the attached Option. However, the remainder of the 
Notice purported to impose a construction of the Option which 
Keate knew was incorrect (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 77; Vol. II, p. 34; 
Vol. IV, p. 102). Stone Company was faced with a dilemma: 
should it rely on the first paragraph which unequivocally 
exercised the Option by incorporating the original terms 
which all parties understood, or should it rely on the 
extraneous wording which all parties knew was incorrect? 
Stone elected to treat the Option as an exercise according to 
the actual terms and forwarded a Notice to this effect to Keate 
(Ex. 6). 
Where, as here, there was a subjective meeting of the 
minds, Keate's attempt to try for a better deal should be 
treated as mere surplusage. See Hawaiian Equipment Co. v. 
Eimco Corp., 115 Utah 590, 207 P.2d 794 (1949); Chournos v. 
Evona Inv. co., 97 Utah 351, 93 P.2d 450 (1939). Any other 
holding would permit Keate to benefit by creating an ambiguity 
for the purpose of permitting him to purchase or decline to 
purchase, depending on later developments. 
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Inasmuch as an Option is considered a continuing offer, 
Williams v. Morgan, 11 Utah 2d 317, 358 P.2d 903 (1961), 
the receipt of the Notice of Exercise constituted an acceptance 
of that offer and the existence of a contract to purchase. 
Stone Company's reply confirmed a closing date of September 18, 
1975, which was within the time stated in Keate's Notice of 
Exerxise. 
Stone Company prepared a warranty deed and had the same 
ready for delivery on September 18, 1975, at the offices of 
Stone Company's attorney (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 80-81; Vol. IV, p. 54; 
Ex. 15). Keate did not appear at the closing and never tendered 
the purchase price and has never attempted to perform his obli-
gations (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 30-31). 
The Option or the offer became part of a contract which 
was formed by acceptance, and was clearly and unequivocally 
breached by Keate. By reason thereof, the Option constituted 
a component of the breached contract and is no longer existing. 
ALTERNATIVE (b): The Option to Purchase was refused and 
rejected by Keate's Counter-Offer. 
under this alternative, the wording of the Notice which 
was inconsistent with the provisions of the Option itself, 
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rather than considered as surplusage, is treated as a counter-
offer. As stated in Hawaiian Equipment Company v. Eimco 
Corporation, 115 Utah 590, 207 P.2d 794 (1949): 
"An acceptance which imposes terms or 
conditions not present in the offer has no validity 
and •.. its only recognition is as a counter-
offer." 
Paragraph 4 of the Option to Purchase clearly states: 
"If this Option is exercised, the total 
purchase price shall be the amount of the first 
mortgage that Optionor has executed with the 
Mortgagee, Valley Bank & Trust Company, 
$125,000.00 plus ten percent (10%) of the 
amount of said mortgage. The Optionee in 
addition to the purchase price will pay all 
costs of closing." 
The wording of this paragraph clearly establishes the 
purchase price as $125, 000. 00 plus ten percent of that amount. 
There is nothing in the paragraph that suggests that the 10% 
rate would be applied to the reduced balance of the mortgage 
at the time of the Exercise. The trial court confirmed the 
meaning of said paragraph, that it meant 10% of $125,000.00 
rather than 10% of the reduced balance of the mortgage (R. 1451 
Nevertheless, the terms of the Notice of Exercise of 
the Option which was served on Stone Company by Keate stated: 
"It is my understanding that said mortgage 
is in the approximate amount of $117,000.00 at 
the present time, and that 10% added to that 
amount equals $128,700.00." 
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In asserting that the 10% rate should be applied to the 
reduced balance of the mortgage, Keate was fully aware that his 
position was a departure from the intended meaning of the 
Option Agreement (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 102). During the course 
of the trial he admitted that Turner had explained to him, 
and that he had understood, that the purchase price would be 
10% of the original loan balance and not the reduced balance at 
the time of Exercise (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 77; Vol. IV, p. 102). 
In the Notice of Exercise of Option Keate also asserted 
construction of the Option which were obviously not in accord-
ance with the terms. He asserted that the purchase price 
provisions set a ceiling on the purchase price of $128,700.00 
and used this to argue that he was not obligated to assume all 
liens and encumbrances despite the wording of the Option: 
"It is also my understanding that under 
paragraph 5 that there are at present two liens 
against the property, one to Valley Bank & Trust 
Company in the amount of $117,000.00 as stated 
above, plus a lien obligation to the LOckhart 
Company in the amount of approximately 
$15,000.00 for a total of $132,000.00, which is 
$3,300.00 more than the purchase price under the 
Option. Because the purchase price cannot 
exceed $128,700.00, the net difference which you 
are obligated to refund to me is $3,300.00, plus 
delivering to me a good and sufficient warranty 
deed." 
This total departure from the wording of the Option 
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constituted a counter-offer which has the effect of con-
stituting a rejection and termination of the original offer. 
In Chournos v. Evona Inv. Co., 97 Utah 335, 93 P.2d 450 
(1939), this Court stated the applicable rule as follows: 
''To constitute a valid exercise of an option 
and impose a duty on the vendor to convey, the 
terms and conditions of the option must be complied 
with by the purchaser. If he attaches to his 
acceptance conditions, not warranted by the terms 
of the option, or notice of his election to buy 
this itself amounts to a rejection •.• we can see 
no reason for reinstating Chournos under the terms 
of the option - terms that he practically repudiated 
by his counter-offer." (Emphasis Added). 
The instant case is very similar to the facts in the Chournos 
case. There is here an intentional departure from the terms 
of the of fer in an attempt to obtain advantages which the 
offeree knows are not within the terms of the offer. Such 
action is clearly a rejection of the offer. 
In Beaumont v. Prieto, 249 U.S. 554 (1919), the optione: 
served a notice of exercise of an option to purchase land that 
departed substantially from the terms of the option. The Supre: 
Court of the United States noted a long established rule of law: 
"Plaintiff made an offer of his own and he 
thereby rejected the offer previously made by 
defendant. It was not afterwards competent 
for him to revive the proposal of defendant, 
by tendering an acceptance of it." 
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In Trautwein v. Leavey, 472 P.2d 776 (Wyo. 1970), the 
court stated the rule as follows: 
"If an offer is rejected, either by an 
absolute refusal or by an acceptance con-
ditionally or not identical with the terms 
of the offer, or by a counter-proposal, the 
party making the original offer is relieved 
from liability on that offer; and the party 
who has rejected the offer cannot afterward, 
at his own option, convert the same offer 
into an agreement by subsequent acceptance. • 
The power of acceptance created by an ordinary 
offer is terminated by a conununicated rejection. 
This is true even though a definite time was 
given by the offerer for considering his 
offer and the rejection is before that time 
has expired. When the offerer receives a 
notice of rejection, he is very likely to 
change his position in reliance thereon •• 
This has led to the rule that a definite 
rejection terminates the offeree's power 
to accept." 
By reason of the intentional rejection of the offer, 
the refusal to comply with the terms of the Option, this Court 
should declare the Option null and void in accordance with the 
acts of the Optionee, Raymond Keate. 
ALTERNATIVE (c): 0ption not exercised and later revoked. 
The law is clear that an option constitutes nothing 
more than an offer. An offer not supported by consideration 
can be withdrawn at any time prior to acceptance. 
It is important to note that all of the transactions 
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involved in this matter, except for the Option, were between 
J. R. Stone Company and Fiber Glass Products Company. Raymond 
Keate was not a party to any of these other transactions. 
Stone purchased the building for use by Fiber Glass Products 
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 49). When the lease of the premises was 
executed, it was between Stone Company and Fiber Glass Products 
(Ex. 4) . The working capital loan was a loan for and on behalf 
of Fiber Glass Products and all proceeds were used by Fiber 
Glass Products (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 36-38; Vol. IV, p. 89). 
However, the Option to Purchase, was granted in favor of Raymor.: 
Keate personally. Keate acknowledged that there was no written 
resolution of the Board of Directors authorizing him to per-
sonally receive this benefit from negotiations which involved 
the company only (Tr. Vol. III, P. 14). 
Keate acknowledged that by granting the Option to him 
personally, no objective of the company was thereby served 
(Tr. Vol. III, p. 12-13). The sole purpose was to benefit him 
personally and enable him to maintain an asset despite any 
failure of the operations of the company (Tr. Vol. III, P· 
12-13). 
Although the Option recites the granting of a con-
sideration, no such consideration was ever paid (Tr. Vol. I, 
-
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pp. 68-70). In such circumstances, the Option may be revoked 
by the optionor at any time prior to a valid exercise. The 
rule has been stated as follows: 
"If no consideration passes, the transaction 
r~solves itself into a mere offer which may be 
withdrawn by the optionor at any time before 
acceptance by the optionee." Whitworth v. Eni tai 
Lumber Company, 220 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1950). 
In further support of the above rule are: Small v. Paulson, 
209 P.2d 779 (Ore. 1949); Prather v. Vasquez, 327 P.2d 963 
(Cal. 1958); Pittsburg Equitable Meter Co. v. Paul c. Loeber & 
Company, 160 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1947). 
Inasmuch as the Notice of Exercise under this Alternative 
did not amount to an acceptance, the offer was revoked by the 
filing of this lawsuit which sought a decree that the Option 
be declared null and void. 
Keate may argue that the consideration for the Option 
although not corning from him, came from Fiber Glass Products 
by the entry into the lease arrangement. However, the lease 
could not be construed as consideration for the Option inasmuch 
as it was the unrelated obligation of a separate party. Moreover, 
even if the lease could be regarded as consideration for the 
Option, it was flagrantly breached by Fiber Glass Products and 
therefore fails as adequate consideration. 
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POINT II 
THE DOCTRINE OF I.ACHES BARS KEATE'S EXERCISE OF OPTION. 
At the trial, plaintiff moved to dismiss defendant's 
counterclaim on the ground that it failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted (Tr. Vol. I, p. 9). on 
the basis of the Court's response to this Motion, defendant 
moved to amend his counterclaim to assert reformation. This 
Motion was granted by the Court over plaintiff's objection 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 8, 12). The basis of defendant's objection 
was that such a claim was unantici~ated and gave rise to equi-
table defenses that plaintiff had no opportunity to raise 
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 8, 14; Vol. II, p. 37; Vol. II, p. 109). 
The Court proceeded on the basis that any equitable claims 
or defenses were permitted (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 3-16). 
With all equitable claims open by the Court, Stone 
Company placed into evidence facts which support the contention 
that Keate's right to exercise the Option is barred by the 
doctrine of laches. 
The grounds for application of the doctrine of laches 
were stated in Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse 
Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah, 1975), as 
follows: 
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"To constitute laches, two elements must be 
established: (1) the lack of diligence on 
th~ part of plaintiff; (2) an injury to defendant 
owing to such lack of diligence. Although lapse 
of t~me is an essential part of laches, the length 
of time must depend on the circumstances of each 
case, for the propriety of refusing a claim 
is equally predicated upon the gravity of the 
prejudice suffered by defendant and the length 
of plaintiff's delay." 
The circumstances of the instant case compel the 
conclusion that there was an intentional delay made in bad 
faith and that by reason thereof Stone Company was severally 
prejudiced. 
The evidence establishes that while Keate was in full 
control of the operations of Fiber Glass Products (Tr. Vol. I, 
pp. 41-42) the building and grounds were abused and damaged 
in total disregard of the obligations of the lease (see citations 
to Record on pages 5-7, supra.). By reason of this damage, 
the building was totally unfit for occupancy at the time it 
was vacated by Fiber Glass Products (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 6-7, 28). 
While the premises were in this condition, Keate made 
no attempt to exercise his option. Rather, he waited until 
Stone company had borrowed money and completed an extensive 
repair and clean-up operation. After the clean-up and repair 
operations were completed and the premises were again tenantable 
and capable of producing income Keate exercised the Option. 
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This failure to assert his right is ample justificatiori 
for the application of the doctrine of laches. However, the 
delay in prejudice to Stone Company did not end with the 
exercise of the Option. 
When Keate gave notice of his intent to exercise the 
Option, he added insult to injury by claiming that he should 
not have to assume the mortgage to the Lockhart Company which 
was incurred to generate funds to pay for the clean-up and 
repair. Despite the wording of the Option, that it was "subjec 
to all liens and encumbrances of record" Keate claimed that 
Stone Company should deduct the cost of cleaning up Keate's 
debris (Ex. 5; R. 102). This claim, together with the claim 
that the purchase price was to be 10% of $117,000.00, which 
Keate knew was unwarranted, caused further delay and prejudice 
to Stone Company. 
The economic effect on Stone Company has been devastati: 
The clean-up and repair operations required the expenditure of 
funds in excess of $19, 000. 00. The time and attention of the 
employees of Stone Company diverted them from their normal busi· 
ness activity, a loss that will never be recovered. Inasmuch a: 
the damage caused by Keate and Fiber Glass Products made the pr: 
mises untenantable, Stone Company lost the income from the 
-
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property for a period of more than ten months, and was unable 
to benefit by the lease guarantee insurance which is conditional 
upon tenantability of the premises. Stone Company has been 
required to prosecute and defend a lawsuit that has been pending 
for more than twenty-two months at a cost of more than $5,000.00. 
All of the legal action has been for the purpose of permitting 
Keate to find judicial sanction for a construction of the Option 
which he knew was not in accordance with the intent of the parties. 
It would be difficult to conceive of a case more 
deserving of the application of equitable principals than this 
case before the court. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE TERMS OF THE OPTION. 
In the event the Court holds that the Option should 
have been declared null and void, it will be unnecessary to 
consider this Point on appeal inasmuch as it involves a 
construction of the Option in the event of later exercise. 
During the course of the trial, the testimony established 
that in connection with the clean-up and repair operations, 
Stone Company engaged the services of John Stone's father 
who worked continuously in the building from February 1, 1975 
to May 1, 1975. (Tr. vol. I, pp. 8-11). Stone Company reimbursed 
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the elder Mr. Stone for this work by deli'very of a · promissory 
note in the sum of $2,SOO.OO together with a mortgage on anoth' 
piece of property owned by Stone Company (Tr. Vol. I, p. 8; 
Ex. Sl). 
The value of labor and other services performed by 
John R. Stone personally amounted to $S,1S6.20 (Ex. SO; Tr. 
Vol. III, p. 30). Of the sum, $2,316.60 was paid from proceed: 
of the Lockhart loan (Ex. SO, 69). This left a balance of 
$2,839.60 (Ex. SO). 
The Court refused to make Keate's Option subject to 
these obligations on the ground that they were not liens and 
encumbrances "of record" and that any lien in favor of John R. 
Stone would be merged into his ownership of the premises. The 
court limited the liens which Keate would have to pay to liens 
recorded pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 
(R. 174-17S). 
The Option to Purchase was prepared by Gerald Turner 
acting exclusively as Raymond Keate's attorney (Tr. Vol. I, 
p. 29). That Option provided: 
"Upon receipt of the purchase price within 
the time allowed, the Optionor will promptly 
execute and deliver to the Optionee a good 
and sufficient warranty deed, subject to all 
liens and encumbrances of record •.. " 
By reason of the performance of labor and services 
on the building in question, John R. Stone and Royal Stone, 
his father, are granted a lien by the provisions of Section 
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38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated. That section specifically states 
that "all persons performing any service or furnishing any 
materials used in the construction, alteration or improvement 
of any building or improvement to any premises in any manner. 
shall have a lien upon the property ••• " 
It is true that if John R. Stone or Royal Stone were 
commencing an action to enforce the lien, such suit would be 
barred by the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-7 
since they did not record their liens within the designated 
time period. However, the issue before the court is not 
whether John Stone and Royal Stone may maintain such an 
action, but whether Keate must pay the lien under the terms 
of the Option Agreement. 
The recording provisions of Section 38-1-7, Utah 
Code Annotated, are for the purpose of imparting notice of 
the lien and to provide a plan of priorities. In this instance, 
Stone Company and Raymond Keate both are in possession with 
knowledge sufficient to put them on actual notice that an 
extensive clean-up and repair operation was undertaken and 
there is no priority question with respect to the lien. 
There is no merger of the lien of John R. Stone with 
the title of Stone company, inasmuch as they are separate 
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entities. Moreover, the lien imposed by Section 38-1-3, 
Utah Code Annotated, extends to the interest of the lessee. 
Buehner Block Company v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 
517 (1957). 
Even if the lien was not imposed by the provisions 
of the contract, or is barred by the provisions of Title 38, 
Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, the trial court should have 
imposed said lien as an equitable lien. 
Equitable liens arise by contract or by conduct by 
of the parties. American Investors Life Insurance Company v. 
Greenshield Plan, Inc., 358 P.2d 473 (Col. 1971). When 
equitable liens are imposed on the basis of contract, it 
must appear that the parties intended to create charge upon 
the designated property. Olson v. Kidman, 120 Utah 443, 
235 P. 2d 510 (1951). However, equitable liens imposed on the 
basis of the conduct of the parties will be imposed if in 
the circumstances they will do justice and equity or prevent 
unjust enrichment. American Investors Life Insurance Compan_Y.. 
Greenshield Plan, Inc., 358 P.2d 473 (Col. 1971); Mannon v. 
Pesula, 139 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1943); Barnes v. Eastern and Wes~ 
Lumber Co., 287 P. 2d 929 (Ore. 1955). Equitable liens will al 
be imposed to prevent injustice when a party has no adequate 
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remedy at law. Oregon Mutual Insurance Co. v. c. E. cornelism, 
330 P.2d 161 (Ore. 1958). 
The facts and circumstances of the instant case 
require the intervention of equity and the imposition of an 
equitable lien to prevent unjust enrichment to Raymond Keate. 
As previously noted, at the time Fiber Glass Products vacated 
the building it was under the supervision and control of 
Raymond Keate (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 41-42). Raymond Keate knew many 
days prior to the termination of business of the company 
that they were going to vacate the building and had employees 
available and at his disposal (Tr. Vol. I, p. 47). Neverthe-
less, he chose to shift the expense of the repair and clean-up 
to the Stone Company because he gave no employees any instruction 
to clean or repair the building at the time the company vacated 
it (Tr. Vol. I, P. 47). This action on his part was in 
direct violation of the provisions of the lease (Ex. 4, ,110). 
By this flagrant breach of the lease, and by the 
intentional acts on the part of Raymond Keate in withholding 
services of his employees working in the building, the expense 
of this massive clean-up operation fell upon the Stone Company. 
Equity should intervene and not permit Raymond Keate to 
benefit by such action. The imposition of an equitable lien 
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would shift the burden to the party who should have borne 
the expense in the first instance. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
erred and abused its discretion in limiting the provisions 
of paragraph 5 of the Option only to those liens recorded 
pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated. 
CONCLUSION 
Stone Company has no dispute with any of the factual 
determinations made by the trial court. The basis of this 
appeal is that those facts compel the granting of the remedy 
sought by the Amended Complaint in this action. It is 
respectfully submitted that the facts and circumstances of 
the case compel the conclusion that the Option to Purchase 
should be declared null and void thereby clearing title to 
the property in question. 
Respectfully subm July, 1977. 
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